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Legal and police documents; technological and sociological information.
1
Notes regarding the neutral documents of a neutral case
I. Neutrality of MIT, a fable revised (through archives)
One of the documents presented here, ”MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL FRUITS
OF INTERCEPTIONS AND DISCLOSURES OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNI-
CATIONS” (followed by another, pertaining to a later period) sheds a new light
on the purported ”neutrality” of MIT evoked in Report to the president.
In this document, we read :
”Mike Halsall, MIT Senior Network & Information Security Analyst,
turned over to Secret Service S/A Michael Pickett” various informa-
tion from the MIT network.
And, further, coming from the defense :
”MIT’s disclosure to the Secret Service of DHCP logs, network flow
data, and packet capture information in the absence of a subpoena
or search warrant”.
MIT staff was overzealous, they simply could not wait to turn over infor-
mation they were not lawfully asked to provide. – This is what we gather from
these documents.
”MIT called campus police to the scene, who, in turn, brought in the Cam-
bridge Police and the Secret Service.” we find yet elsewhere, in them.
”The ruse worked. Within an hour of their departure, the hacker
returned.”
we read even further.
”no one has sought a warrant” the involved FBI agent about even wrote
himself.
He could not believe his luck, that day. He was ready to confiscate the
material ’at any moment’. Like a boy in a candy store, was his experience of
MIT – to be vulgar.
Hal Abelson wrote the words ”neutral” and ”neutrality” a staggering 100
times, without even knowing it. And, so a 100 times we must call them back to
both more care, and more courage.
II. More technical documents
”MOTION TO SUPPRESS” is the most important source of technical in-
formation besides the already highlighted Sep. 2012 superseding indictment1;
as well as ”GOVERNMENT’S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO DEFEN-
DANT’S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS” from Nov. 2012.
This one holds the enormous phrase :
1(Although we used the superseding indictment from 2012, there’s a similar document from
c. 2010, with small changes e.g. keepgrabbing2.py is capitalized)
2
”The Victims: JSTOR and MIT”
MIT is a billion dollar heavy university whose reputation is in substantial
part based on ”hackers” (the term used in this one document to describe Aaron
Swartz) that now found themselves defendants in lawsuits.
These ’victims”, their lawyers, their staff, or the courts, call research ”things
of value” (superseding indictment), in these legal documents. and put a price
on it. ”in excess of 5,000$” (ibid.), ”50,000$” (police report).
***
All of these documents, all in their own way, shed light on our modern
information societies :
They shed light on the practices of not only surveillance agencies (i.e. LinkedIn
pages) but also courts (”Twitter postings”, as the honorable Carmen Ortiz wrote
in a message that must have been like a slap to the face of Aaron’s lawyer), and
the methods used by various engineers in the monitoring of institutional net-
works.
Unchanged is the might of corporations whose financial interests, once touched,
lead to an avalanche of legal papers, we went through all of them, so we know.
Enough to bury and kill someone.
Historians and sociologists will read these documents with great care, interest
— as will hopefully others. ”You poor take courage, your rich take care”.
Annex :
– 1 ”SWARTZ’s online profiles” (FBI file)
– 2 ”RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS” in Cambridge, MA and Brooklyn, NY (USA
v. Swartz)
– 3 Seized electronic equipment (USA v. Swartz)2
– 4 Current employer (USA v. Swartz)
– 5 ”MOTION TO SUPPRESS” (USA v. Swartz)
– 6 ”GOVERNMENT’S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE” (USA v. Swartz)
– 7 Logs
– 8 Photos
– 9 Police report
– 10 FBI e-mail
References
Aaron Swartz’s FBI File https://archive.org/details/AaronHSwartzFBIFile/
USA vs. Aaron Swartz https://archive.org/details/555334-1-11-cr-10260-nmg/





UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 
UNITED STATES )    
OF AMERICA| ) 
 )  
v. )  Crim. No. 11-CR-10260-NMG 
 )  
                       AARON SWARTZ, )  
                       Defendant. )   
 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CHANGE RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS 
 
 Aaron Swartz moves this Court for leave to change his residential address to 76 
Oxford St # 1, Cambridge, MA 02138-1809.  Mr. Swartz has already reported this change 
to Pretrial Services Officer Gina Affsa. The residential change is necessary because his 
former landlord would not extend his lease on his Massachusetts Avenue apartment.  
 As reported at the arraignment, Mr. Swartz has begun working as independent 
contractor performing research for a New York City company.  This work requires Mr. 
Swartz to spend variable days of the week in New York City. When he stays over night in 
New York, Mr. Swartz’s address is 99 Graham Street, Apt. #1, Brooklyn, New York 
11206. 
 Mr. Swartz reports in person weekly to the Pretrial Services office in Boston.  
                                            Respectfully submitted, 
 
                                                        /s/Andrew Good 
           Andrew Good 
                                                       BBO # 201240 
      Good & Cormier 
                                                        83 Atlantic Avenue 
                                                        Boston, MA 02110 
                                                        Tel. 617-523-5933 
                                                       agood@goodcormier.com 
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U.S. Department of Justice 
Carmen M. Ortiz 
United States Attorney 
District of Massachusetts 
Main Reception: (61 7) 748-3100 United States Courthouse, Suite 9200 
1 Courthouse Way 
Boston, Massachusetts 0221 0 
August 12,201 1 
Mr. Andrew Good 
Good and Cormier 
83 Atlantic Avenue 
Boston, MA 02 1 10 
Re: United States v. Aaron Swartz 
Criminal No. 1 1 -CR- 1 0260 
Dear Counsel: 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 and Rules 1 16.1 (C) and 1 16.2 of the Local Rules of the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the government provides the 
following automatic discovery in the above-referenced case: 
A. Rule 16 Materials 
1. Statements of Defendant under Rule 16 (a)(l)(A) & (a)(l )(B) 
a. Written Statements 
The defendant's booking sheet and fingerprint card from the Cambridge Police 
Department are contained on enclosed Disk 5. 
There are numerous relevant statements not made to government agents drafted by 
Defendant Swartz before the date of his arrest contained in electronic media, such as Twitter 
postings, websites and e-mail. These are equally available to the defendant. Those that the 
government intends to use in its case-in-chief are available for your review, as described in 
paragraph A(3) below. 
Subject thereto, there are no relevant written statements of Defendant Swartz made 
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Acer laptop computer recovered at MIT 
Western Digital hard drive recovered at MIT 
HP USB drive seized from the defendant at the time of his arrest 
Apple iMac computer seized at Harvard 
Western Digital hard drive seized at Harvard 
HTC G2 cell phone seized during the search of the defendant's residence 
Nokia 2320 cell phone seized during the search of the defendant's residence 
Sony Micro Vault seized during the search of the defendant's residence 
Four Samsung hard drives delivered to the Secret Service by Defendant Swartz and his 
counsel on June 7,201 1 (Please note that because of the number of files contained on 
Sarnsung model HD154UI hard drive, serial number SlY6JlC2800332, it has not been 
practicable to date to make a complete file list in an Excel readable format, unlike the 
other drives .) 
A fingerprint analysis report from the Cambridge Police Department with respect to the 
Acer Laptop and Western Digital hard drive recovered at MIT 
A supplemental fingerprint analysis report with respect to these items 
While not required by the rules, intermediate as well as final forensic reports where available are 
enclosed for many of the recovered and seized pieces of equipment on Disks 6 and 1, 
respectively. 
B. Search Materials under Local Rule 1 16.1(C)(l)(b) 
Search warrants were executed on multiple pieces of electronic equipment and at multiple 
locations. Copies of the search warrants, applications, affidavits, and returns have already been 
provided to you, but are further found on Disk 3. 
Four Sarnsung Model HD154UI hard drives were examined following their consensual 
and unconditional delivery to the United States Secret Service on June 7,201 1. As an additional 
precaution, a warrant, enclosed on Disk 3, was also obtained. 
C. Electronic Surveillance under Local Rule 1 16.1 (C)(l)(c) 
No oral, wire, or electronic communications of the defendant as defined in 18 U.S.C. $ 
25 10 were intercepted relating to the charges in the indictment. 
D. Consensual Interceptions under Local Rule 1 16.1 (C)(l)(d) 
There were no interceptions (as the term "intercept" is defined in 18 U.S.C. 5 2510(4)) of 
wire, oral, or electronic communications relating to the charges contained in the indictment, 
made with the consent of one of the parties to the communication in which the defendant was 
intercepted or which the government intends to offer as evidence in its case-in-chief. 
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MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL FRUITS OF INTERCEPTIONS AND DISCLOSURES OF
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER INFORMATION BY MIT
PERSONNEL IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
(MOTION TO SUPPRESS NO. 1)
Now comes the defendant Aaron Swartz and respectfully moves that this Honorable Court
suppress as evidence at the trial of this case (1) the network flow data and DHCP logs collected by
MIT personnel and disclosed to the government without a warrant or court order or subpoena, as
well as all evidence derived therefrom, and (2) all evidence from the packet capture instituted by
MIT personnel on the morning of January 4, 2011, and continuing, at the request of the government
that MIT personnel continue to intercept electronic communications, through January 6, 2011, and
subsequently turned over to the Secret Service, as well as all evidence derived therefrom.1
As reason therefor, defendant states:
 In a separate motion to suppress, Swartz contends that after law enforcement agents arrived1
on the scene on January 4, 2011, and recommended that MIT personnel continue the packet capture
they had begun earlier that morning and began to direct the investigation, MIT personnel were acting
as government agents, and their actions were therefore subject to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. See Motion to Suppress All Fruits of Warrantless Searches Conducted from January
4, 2011, to January 6, 2011, And Incorporated Memorandum of Law. This motion is directed in part
at the interceptions conducted by MIT personnel before they began acting as government agents, as
well as MIT’s turning over to the government material in which Swartz had a reasonable expectation
of privacy, in the complete absence of judicial process compelling MIT to produce such evidence
to the government at a time when law enforcement agents were directing MIT employees regarding
how to further their criminal investigation of the defendant.
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1.  He had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic communications flowing to
and from his ACER netbook.2
2.  The interception of network flow data to the netbook and the packet capture constituted
interceptions of electronic communications within the meaning of Title III.
3.  The interceptions conducted by MIT and its disclosure of the information gathered to the
Secret Service violated 18 U.S.C. §2511(1), as no exceptions to the requirements of Title III apply
to MIT’s conduct. The evidence, along with all derivative fruits thereof, must, therefore, be
suppressed as violative of the Fourth Amendment.
4. The disclosure of DHCP logs by MIT personnel in the absence of a warrant issued upon
a showing of probable cause or a court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) violated the Fourth
Amendment and/or the Stored Communications Act.
5.  MIT’s disclosure to the Secret Service of DHCP logs, network flow data, and packet
capture information in the absence of a subpoena or search warrant violated 18 U.S.C. §§2702, 2703,
as well as Swartz’s rights under the Fourth Amendment such that suppression of the evidence, as
well as all derivative fruits, in required.
THE DEFENDANT REQUESTS A HEARING ON THE WITHIN MOTION.
LOCAL RULE 7.1(A)(2) STATEMENT
The undersigned counsel has conferred with AUSA Stephen Heymann. The government
opposes the suppression remedies sought and will respond to defendant’s request for a hearing in its
response to the motion.
 All averments herein regarding Swartz’s ownership and possession of the ACER netbook2
and the attached hard drive, and the communications flowing to and from them, are made pursuant
to the protections provided by Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1968).  
2




On September 26, 2010, MIT received an email from Brian Larsen at JSTOR, an online
archive of scholarly journal articles, informing it that there had been, that morning, an excessive
downloading of journals. By the next day, the IP addresses from which the journals were being
downloaded had been located (largely, if not exclusively, by JSTOR) and the user information for
the guest registration of the computer being used had been identified; JSTOR then blocked access
to these IP addresses. Timeline of events related to JSTOR downloading incident: 9/26/10 - 1/6/11,
Exhibit 1 (“Timeline”) at 1.  On October 9, 2010, JSTOR again notified MIT that its access was
being blocked because of excessive downloading. Timeline at 2. JSTOR quickly identified the IP
address being used for the downloads, and MIT personnel thereafter discovered that access was
being accomplished in Building 16 by a computer registered through its visitor guest registration
process by the same guest whose computer was linked to the September incident.  Timeline at 2-3.3
MIT and JSTOR conferred  regarding methods to prevent excessive downloading. Timeline
at 3-4. On  December 26, 2010, there was another episode of excessive downloading, which MIT
personnel did not learn of until on or about January 3, 2011. On the morning of January 4, 2011, at
approximately 8:00 am, MIT personnel located the netbook being used for the downloads and
decided to leave it in place and institute a packet capture of the network traffic to and from the
netbook.  Timeline at 6. This was accomplished using the laptop of Dave Newman, MIT Senior4
 MIT personnel first received notice of the October 9, 2010, incident when they returned3
following the Columbus Day holiday on October 12, 2010. Timeline at 2.
 A packet capture captures the entire communication, including subject matter and content,4
and to the extent it was diverting and copying communications in transit to and from the netbook,
this constituted a classic interception of electronic communications in violation of United States v.
Councilman,  418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005)(en banc). See page 9, infra.
3
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Network Engineer, which was connected to the netbook and intercepted the communications coming
to and from it. Id. Later that day, beginning at 11:00 am, the Secret Service assumed control of the
investigation.  Later on January 4, 2011, Mike Halsall, MIT Senior Network & Information Security5
Analyst, turned over to Secret Service S/A Michael Pickett “historical network flow data concerning
18.55.6.240 & 7.240 [the IP addresses associated with the earlier JSTOR downloads]  dating from6
12/14 until present and relevant DHCP log information  from prior occurrences of ghost-macbook7
and ghost-laptop [the two guest registrations at issue] JSTOR downloading incidents (from Sept. and
Oct.).” Timeline at 7. The disclosure took place only after the MIT General Counsel’s Office
approved the disclosure of the information to law enforcement authorities even in the absence of a
warrant or court order or subpoena – and at a time when MIT personnel were acting as government
agents – and in contravention of MIT policy that such information, which exceeded that found in
bank records or telephone toll records, would be disclosed only upon the receipt of lawful court
orders or subpoenas, i.e., process complying with the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §2701
et seq. See Section IV, infra. In a separate email from Halsall to S/A Picket on January 8, 2011,
Halsall told Pickett that he “hop[ed] to have the pcap/flows/videos/logs all in by to me Monday,
  See Motion to Suppress All Fruits of Warrantless Searches Conducted from January 4,5
2011, to January 6, 2011, And Incorporated Memorandum of Law. 
 Network flow data shows connections made between computers and the amount of6
information transmitted. It shows the start and stop time of a connection, the source IP address, the
IP address of the website contacted, source and destination port numbers, and the number of bytes
of information transmitted.
 “DHCP” stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. DHCP assists7
 with the assignment of IP addresses to computers on networks. When a computer joins a network,
the computer issues a DHCP request on the network, which asks a DHCP server on the network to
provide an IP address to the requesting computer. Part of the information contained in this request
is the MAC (Media Access Control) address which is a unique identifier of the network card
contained in the computer requesting an IP address. It also includes the commands made by the
computer in question. See page 7, infra.
4
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possibly sooner – if you don’t already have a copy of the video or pcap [packet capture], I’ll make
sure you get one.” Exhibit 2. No warrant or court order has been provided to counsel which would
evidence the government’s having, even post-interception, acquired the contents of the warrantless
interceptions by seeking judicial authorization as required.
II. MIT’S ACTIONS VIOLATED TITLE III.
A. Swartz Had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in his Electronic
Communications to and from his Netbook.8
Swartz had a subjective expectation of privacy in electronic communications to and from his
netbook, and that expectation is one which society should recognize as objectively reasonable. The
netbook was connected to the MIT network, but “the mere act of accessing a network does not in
itself extinguish privacy expectations.” United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.
2007). MIT has a liberal guest access policy, which was described by Tim McGovern, MIT Manager
of Network Security & Support Services, as follows:
No authentication of visitors. Visitor network access is provided as an on-demand self-
service process for anyone who walks onto campus, plugs in, or elects to use our wireless
network, and declares themselves a visitor, and they get 14 days of network privileges. 
No identity verification. Visitors are asked to provide an email address. The email address
is not used to verify that a bona fide identity exists . . . . 
No authentication of users accessing JSTOR.org. By agreement, JSTOR.org allows any
computer with a net 18 IP address [an MIT IP address] to access their resources without
further identification or authentication.
Exhibit 3. In fact, in internal emails, JSTOR described MIT as “unique” in having an open campus.
Exhibit 4. Unlike other institutions which require passwords to access their servers and require
additional layers of authentication to access digital libraries such as JSTOR, MIT required neither
 Swartz incorporates by reference the discussion in Section II of his Motion to Suppress All8
Fruits of Warrantless Searches Conducted from January 4, 2011, to January 6, 2011, And
Incorporated Memorandum of Law.
5
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a password, a formal affiliation with the school, or any form of identification for any visitor to
become an authorized guest enjoying access to the MIT electronic communication service which was
the equal of that afforded to MIT students and professors. 
Swartz was validly signed on to the MIT network as a guest, as the MIT guest policy
permitted him to be, as verified by an October 14, 2010, email from Ellen Duranceau, MIT Program
Manager of Scholarly Publishing and Licensing, to Brian Larsen at JSTOR, informing him that
“[o]ur investigations here point to the same guest that was involved in the 9/27 incident. We don’t
have enough information to follow the trail completely, but the signs suggest that the same guest
user was responsible for this latest activity. . . . all of this excessive use was caused by a guest visitor
at MIT,” Exhibit 5 (emphasis added), and then by an October 18, 2010, email from Ms. Duranceau
to Tim McGovern, MIT Manager of Network Security & Support Services: 
Tim and Mike:
Would  it be accurate for me to answer [JSTOR’s] query this way:
“We offer guests access to the MIT network, and this practice will continue. However, once
we [in the future] institute our additional authorization layer for JSTOR, this route will be
closed to guests. So we will have closed the pathway used.”
* * * *
Mike, I will be asking JSTOR about your mod_rewrite idea once I check in with Rich
Wenger in the Libraries and once JSTOR has shifted more clearly into implementing the new
method rather than still working on resolving the excessive use issue.
Exhibit 6 (emphasis added). Thus, MIT had an open-access network that permitted anyone to access
it by signing in as a visitor/guest, and anyone signed in to the MIT network was permitted to access
JSTOR without further identification or authorization. The name and email address used to sign in
as a visitor were fundamentally irrelevant to MIT, as it did not use it in any way to identify the visitor
or even to ascertain whether it was a “bona fide identity,” nor did guests to the MIT network receive
notice that they were prohibited from using static IP addresses, changing IP addresses, or changing
MAC addresses when accessing the MIT network on successive occasions. Neither MIT nor JSTOR
6
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initiated the additional authorization protocol prior to the seizure of the netbook and Swartz’s arrest
on January 6, 2011.
That MIT regarded Swartz as a guest user is also confirmed by several other MIT
communications during the fall of 2010. On September 29, 2010, Ellen Duranceau informed Brian
Larsen at JSTOR that “the origin of the activity was a guest visiting MIT.” Exhibit 7 (emphasis
added). JSTOR is available to “[u]sers [who] come to MIT to establish a guest account on the
network, and “do not have to have MIT affiliation to use the content.” Summary of Key Points by
Ellen Duranceau, Exhibit 8. See Email from Ellen Duranceau to Ann Wolpert, October 15, 2010,
Exhibit 9  (“we cannot identify the guest involved in these incidents” (emphasis added)); Email from
Ellen Duranceau to Brian Larsen, October 15, 2010, Exhibit 10 (“[o]ur records and logs . . . do not
allow us to definitively identify the guest” (emphasis added); Email from Ellen Duranceau to Rich
Wenger, October 18, 2010, Exhibit 11 (“it appears that the individual used MIT’s wireless network
guest account process”). 
In addition, MIT’s  written policy on DHCP logs created a reasonable expectation of privacy
in that information, providing that they would be deleted after 30 days, IS&T Policies:DHCP Usage
Logs Policy, available at http://ist.mit.edu/about/policies/dhcp-usage-logs (last visited September
24, 2012), and that they would be disclosed only in response to a court order or subpoena:
When any network device, e.g., a computer, connects to MITnet and is assigned a dynamic
IP address, MIT's DHCP server adds a record to its log containing the following information:
• The date and time of the request 
• The MAC address of the requesting device or computer 
• The IP address provided 
• The specific DHCP command that was issued 
• Other technical information related to the request
In the event of a request relating to a potential legal proceeding, IS&T staff may create a case
in Request Tracker and store subsets of a log pertinent to the case at hand in the case record.
7
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 59   Filed 10/05/12   Page 7 of 21
271
The DHCP server is in a secure location and complies with secure data storage best practices.
IS&T's Network Services Infrastructure team acts as the data custodian for DHCP logs, and
ensures that the logs are stored securely and are deleted when they expire.
* * * *
MIT is required to comply with a court order or valid subpoena that requests the disclosure
of information contained in DHCP logs. Failure to comply could have serious consequences
for the individuals, IS&T, and the Institute. MIT's Office of the General Counsel is qualified
and authorized to confirm that a request for information contained in logs is legitimate and
not an improper attempt to gain access to confidential information.
Id. (emphasis added).
Moreover, on many occasions, the MIT RADIUS log server provided further evidence
documenting MIT’s authorization of Swartz’s access to the MIT network:
Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) is a networking protocol that
provides centralized Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) management for
computers to connect and use a network service. . . . Because of the broad support and the
ubiquitous nature of the RADIUS protocol, it is often used by ISPs and enterprises to manage
access to the Internet or internal networks, wireless networks, and integrated e-mail services.
. . . The RADIUS server is usually a background process running on a UNIX or Microsoft
Windows server. RADIUS serves three functions:
• to authenticate users or devices before granting them access to a network, 
• to authorize those users or devices for certain network services and 
• to account for usage of those services.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RADIUS (last visited September 23, 2012)(emphasis added).  Swartz,
accordingly, maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications to and from his
netbook and that expectation was objectively reasonable.
B. MIT’s Actions in Intercepting Communications to and from Swartz’s Netbook
and Disclosure of the Intercepted Communications Violated Title III.
18 U.S.C. §2511(1) prohibits:
(a) intentionally intercept[ing], endeavor[ing] to intercept, or procur[ing] any other person
to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; 
* * * *
(c) intentionally disclos[ing], or endeavor[ing] to disclose, to any other person the contents
of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
8
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information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection; 
(d) intentionally us[ing], or endeavor[ing] to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this
subsection . . . .
 18 U.S.C. §2510(12) defines “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce
. . . .” Section 2510(4) defines “intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device.” “Contents” is in turn defined as “any information concerning the substance, purport or
meaning” of the communication. §2510(8)(emphasis added). 
The packet capture, which targeted the content of data being sent to or from the netbook that
was discovered in Building 16's data room, revealed the contents of electronic communications of
all electronic communications intercepted. See Email from Dave Newman, MIT Senior Network
Engineer, to S/A Pickett, January 5, 2011, Exhibit 12 (“I have collected about 70G of network traffic
so far with about 98% of which is the JSTOR journal downloads”). Use of the packet capture
constituted the interception of electronic communications of the defendant and others, including, but
not limited to, those with whom he was communicating within the meaning of Title III, see, e.g.,
United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005)(en banc)(diverting incoming
communications constitutes interception within the meaning of Title III), which was unlawful in the
absence of a valid Title III order authorizing the interceptions of the electronic communications, of
which none were sought or issued here. 
9
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)





GOVERNMENT’S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
The Court should deny Defendant Aaron Swartz’s five motions to suppress (Dkt. Nos 59-
63), which attack the manner in which the Government collected the vast majority of electronic
and physical evidence in this case.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Victims: JSTOR and MIT
A research or university library can find the cost and space to maintain a comprehensive
collection of academic journals extraordinarily expensive.  Founded in 1995, JSTOR is an
independent, self-sustaining, non-profit organization that provides research and university
libraries access to numerous academic journals without the normal costs of a paper-based
collection.  To do so, JSTOR digitizes articles and distributes them over an online system that it
built, which enables libraries to outsource the journals’ storage, ensures their preservation, and
enables them to be searched extensively by authorized users.
JSTOR pays copyright-holders for permission to digitize the copyright-holders’ articles
and make them available online.1  To pay its expenses, JSTOR normally charges subscription
1 Some materials available on JSTOR are not subject to copyright. 
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generally and at Swartz specifically; and (f) elude detection and identification. 
II. THE FACTS
Late during the night of September 24, 2010, an individual registered his computer on
MIT’s campus and obtained a guest account on MIT’s computer network.  The individual did not
provide his true identity at this or any subsequent time, and neither MIT personnel nor law
enforcement officers knew the individual’s name until his arrest months later.  The individual
registered his computer by specifying his name as “Gary Host,” a pseudonym, and his e-mail
address as ghost@mailinator.com, a disposable e-mail address by virtue of its requiring no initial
e-mail registration and keeping no records of e-mail access.3  Before assigning the computer an
IP address, MIT’s network automatically collected the computer’s owner-created name —
“ghost laptop” — and the unique identifying number associated with the computer’s Internet
networking hardware, known as the computer’s Media Access Control or “MAC” address. 
These are standard login and communication procedures.
MIT’s DHCP4 computer server then used a standard Internet protocol to assign the
individual an IP address (18.55.6.215) for use while on the network.  The network kept records
of the computer’s registration information, its IP address, and its MAC address.  These records
are standard computer-networking records, and did not include any computer commands that the
individual typed in or ran, or any data that the computer downloaded.  (Exs. 6, 7). 
3 Mailinator advertised itself as a free e-mail service that would accept mail for any e-
mail address directed to mailinator.com without need for a prior registration or account; would
automatically delete all e-mail after several hours, whether read or not; and would keep no logs
(records) of e-mail access.
4 DHCP is the acronym for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. 
4
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On September 25, 2010, the day after registering the “ghost laptop,” the individual used
the “ghost laptop” to systematically access and rapidly download an extraordinary volume of
articles from JSTOR by using a software program that sidestepped JSTOR’s computerized limits
on the volume of each user’s downloads.  The downloads and requests for downloads were so
numerous, rapid, and massive that they impaired the performance of JSTOR’s computers.
As JSTOR, and then MIT, became aware of these downloads and problems, both
attempted to block the individual’s computer from further communications.  On the evening of
September 25, 2010, after suffering hundreds of thousands of downloads from the ghost laptop,
JSTOR temporarily ended the downloads by blocking network access from the computer at IP
address 18.55.6.215.
The next day, however, the ghost laptop’s user obtained a new IP address from MIT’s
network, changing the last digit in its IP address by one from 18.55.6.215 to 18.55.6.216.  This
defeated JSTOR’s IP address block, enabling the ghost laptop to resume furiously downloading
articles from JSTOR.  This downloading continued until the middle of September 26, when
JSTOR spotted it and blocked communication from IP address 18.55.6.216 as well.
The September 25 and 26 downloads had impaired JSTOR’s computers and
misappropriated significant portions of its archive.  Because the download requests had
originated from two MIT IP addresses that had begun with 18.55.6 — that is, 18.55.6.215 and
18.55.6.216 — JSTOR began blocking a broader range of MIT IP addresses on September 26. 
The new block prevented MIT researchers assigned MIT IP addresses 18.55.6.0 through
18.55.6.255 (as many as 253 computers) from performing research through JSTOR’s archive for
three to four days.
5
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Moreover, when JSTOR notified MIT of the problems, MIT, too, banned the “ghost
laptop” from using its network.  To do this, MIT terminated the ghost laptop’s guest registration
on September 27, 2010, and prohibited the computer, as identified by its hardware MAC address,
from being assigned a new IP address again through the guest registration process.
On October 2, 2010, less than a week after JSTOR and MIT had barred the individual’s
ghost laptop from communicating with their networks, the individual obtained yet another guest
connection for the ghost laptop on MIT’s network.  Having recognized that MIT or JSTOR had
blocked his ghost laptop by recognizing its MAC address, the individual now manipulated the
ghost laptop’s MAC address to mislead MIT into believing that he was a new and different guest
registrant.5
Six days later, the individual connected a second computer to MIT’s network and created
another guest account using pseudonyms similar to those he had used with the “ghost laptop”: he
registered the new computer under the name “Grace Host”, a temporary email address of
ghost42@mailinator.com, and a computer client name of “ghost macbook.”
On October 9, 2010, the individual activated the ghost laptop and the ghost macbook to
download JSTOR’s articles once again.  The downloads came so fast and numerous that the
individual again significantly impaired the operation of some of JSTOR’s computers.
Once again, MIT could not identify who was controlling these computers or where they
were physically located, and JSTOR could not isolate the interloper to a consistent IP address
5 A computer’s MAC address is initially assigned by an equipment manufacturer, but can
be misrepresented electronically by a knowledgeable user.  The user altered the ghost laptop’s
MAC address to appear as 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc rather than the prior MAC address of
00:23:5a:73:5f:fb.
6
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that could be blocked.  Consequently, JSTOR blocked access by every computer using an MIT
IP address campus-wide for approximately three days, again depriving legitimate MIT users
from accessing JSTOR’s services.  And MIT blocked computers using the ghost laptop’s and the
ghost macbook’s MAC addresses as well.
Nevertheless, between the end of October and January 6, 2011, the hacker obtained at
least three new IP addresses and assigned his computer two new MAC addresses.  He also
moderated the speed of the downloads, which made them less noticeable to JSTOR.  The
exfiltration of JSTOR’s collection was nonetheless extreme: over this period, the individual
downloaded well over a million of JSTOR’s articles.
Because the hacker had modified the speed of his downloads, JSTOR did not notice his
latest downloads until around Christmas, 2010. Once noticed, however, JSTOR provided MIT
with the hacker’s latest IP address.  Now that MIT’s network security personnel had a more
robust set of network tools, they could consult network traffic routing records and trace the IP
address back to a concrete physical location on campus.
So on January 4, 2011, an MIT network security analyst traced the hacker’s IP address to
a network switch located in a basement wiring closet in MIT’s Building 16.  Building 16's street-
level doors have no-trespassing signs posted on them.  (Ex. 8).  The wiring closet is protected by
a pair of locked steel doors.  (Ex. 9).  The closet is generally locked, but at that time its lock
could be forced by a quick jerk of  its double doors.  When MIT personnel entered the closet,
they found a cardboard box with a wire leading from it to a computer network switch.  (Ex. 10).6 
6 MIT personnel removed the box from the laptop at first, and then MIT personnel or law
enforcement officers replaced the box on one or more occasions. The second photograph was
taken after the box was replaced, not when it was initially found. 
7
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Hidden under the box was the ghost laptop, an Acer-brand laptop, connected to a separate hard
drive for excess storage.  (Ex. 11).  The network cable connected the laptop to the network
switch, thus giving the laptop Internet access.  (Ex. 12).  The laptop’s direct connection to the
network switch was unusual because MIT does not connect computers directly to those switches.
MIT called campus police to the scene, who, in turn, brought in the Cambridge Police
and the Secret Service.  Over the course of the morning and early afternoon of January 4th, MIT
and law enforcement officers collaboratively7 took several steps to identify the perpetrator and
learn what he was up to: 
(1) Cambridge Police crime scene specialists fingerprinted the
laptop’s interior and exterior and the external hard drive and its
enclosure;
(2) MIT placed and operated a video camera inside the closet, which,
as discussed below, later recorded the hacker (subsequently
identified as Aaron Swartz) entering the wiring closet and
performing tasks within it;
(3) The Secret Service opened the laptop and sought to make a copy of
its volatile memory (RAM), which would automatically be
destroyed when the laptop’s power was turned off, but the effort
resulted in their seeing only the laptop’s user sign-in screen;
(4) MIT connected a second laptop to the network switch in order to
record the laptop’s communications, a type of recording often
referred to as a “packet capture;” the Secret Service subsequently
concurred with the packet capture, none of which was turned over
to officers until MIT was issued a subpoena after Swartz’s arrest;8
(5) Beginning on January 4, 2011, MIT agreed to provide, and later
provided, the Secret Service copies of network logs pertaining to
7 From the time of law enforcement’s arrival on January 4, 2011, through the suspect’s
arrest and identification on January 6, 2011, the effort by MIT and law enforcement to identify
the individual was both consensual and collaborative.
8 This second laptop is seen on a chair in Ex. 10.
8
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the ghost laptop and ghost macbook between September 24, 2010
and January 6, 2011, some of which records were provided
consensually, the remainder of which were provided pursuant to a
subpoena to MIT.9
By mid-day on January 4th, MIT and law enforcement personnel had completed their
initial crime scene investigation.  Experience told them that merely removing the hacker’s
computer equipment would just result in his renewing his efforts elsewhere.  So, rather than take
the hacker’s equipment away, MIT and law enforcement instead restored the closet to its initial
appearance upon discovery, and monitored who entered it and handled the laptop.  In this way,
the hacker would not necessarily know that his criminal tools had been discovered, his identity
might be uncovered, and he could be stopped.
The ruse worked.  Within an hour of their departure, the hacker returned.  After entering
the wiring closet and shutting the doors behind him, (Ex. 13), the hacker replaced the hard drive
connected to the laptop with a new one he took from his backpack, and then concealed his
equipment once again underneath the cardboard box.
Two days later, on January 6, 2011, the hacker returned to the wiring closet yet again.
This time, worried about being identified, the hacker covered his face with his bicycle helmet as
he entered the closet.  (Ex. 14).  Once inside and with the door closed, the hacker disconnected
the laptop and placed it, the external hard drive, and the network cable in his backpack.  (Ex. 15). 
As he left, he again hid his face with his bicycle helmet.  (Ex. 16). 
By January 6, 2011, the hacker had downloaded a major portion of the 6 to 7 million
articles then contained in JSTOR’s digitized database.  
9  As discussed below, both the law and MIT’s policies and procedures allowed MIT to
turn these records over consensually, but it also could, and at points did, insist upon a subpoena.
9
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A little after 2:00 that afternoon, MIT Police Captain Albert Pierce, who had been
involved in the investigation, was heading down Massachusetts Avenue within a mile of MIT
when he spotted a bicycler who looked like the hacker caught on the wiring closet video. 
Captain Pierce identified himself as a police officer.  After a brief exchange, the individual
dropped his bike to the ground and ran away.  The individual was chased, apprehended, arrested,
and identified as Aaron Swartz.  During a search incident to arrest, Cambridge police found a
USB storage drive in Swartz’s backpack, which they seized and stored as evidence.
Approximately an hour later, MIT technical staff used computer routing and addressing
records to locate Swartz’s ghost laptop and hard drive in the Student Information Processing
Board’s office in MIT’s student center.  Law enforcement found the equipment on the floor
under a desk.  (Ex. 17).  The equipment was subsequently seized and stored as evidence by
Cambridge Police.
Aaron Swartz was charged by the Commonwealth in a criminal complaint alleging
breaking and entering into MIT’s property with intent to commit a felony, and was subsequently
indicted by a Massachusetts grand jury for the same charge along with stealing JSTOR’s
electronically processed or stored data, and accessing a computer system without authorization.
While the Commonwealth pursued state charges, the U.S. Attorney’s Office began a
separate investigation on January 5, 2011.  On February 9, 2011, the Secret Service obtained a
warrant to search Swartz’s apartment, followed by a warrant to search his office on February 11,
2011.  Both were executed on February 11th.  Also on February 9, 2011, the Secret Service
obtained warrants to seize from the Cambridge Police and then search the laptop, the hard drive,
and the USB storage device.  These warrants were returned unexecuted and new warrants were
10
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Activity in MITnet computer registration database 
 
Fields: 
mac, status, account, bcontact, tcontact, ace_type, ace, visit_name, visit_email, visit_phone, visit_sponsor, visit_course, visit_class, visit_total, visit_expires, comment, created_dt, created_tm, created_by, modified_dt, modified_tm, modified_by 
 
Registration on Sept. 24: 
INSERT INTO host_less  VALUES ('00235a735ffb',0,'visitor',NULL,NULL,0,0,'Gary Host','ghost@mailinator.com','','',NULL,NULL,5,'29-Sep-2010','','24-Sep-2010','22:46:19',0,'30-Sep-2010','12:57:46',182635)\g 
 
Registration on Oct. 2: 
INSERT INTO host_less  VALUES ('00235a735ffc',0,'visitor',NULL,NULL,0,0,'Gary Host','ghost42@mailinator.com','','',NULL,NULL,10,'13-Oct-2010','','02-Oct-2010','10:20:37',0,'13-Oct-2010','05:54:22',182635)\g 
 
Registration on Oct. 8: 
INSERT INTO host_less  VALUES ('0017f22cb074',0,'visitor',NULL,NULL,0,0,'Grace Host','ghost42@mailinator.com','','',NULL,NULL,5,'13-Oct-2010','','08-Oct-2010','22:13:26',0,'14-Oct-2010','10:45:57',182635)\g 
 
Registration on Oct. 22: 
INSERT INTO host_less  VALUES ('004ce5a0c755',1,'visitor',NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,'Grace Host','ghost42@mailinator.com','','',NULL,NULL,10,'11-Nov-2010','','22-Oct-2010','21:39:30',0,'06-Nov-2010','22:12:19',0)\g 
 
Registration on Nov. 28: 




Activity in DHCP logs corresponding to computer registration database 
 
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20100925.gz:Sep 24 22:45:35 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.247 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fb (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
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ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20100930.gz:Sep 29 01:31:29 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.247 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fb (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20100930.gz:Sep 29 01:39:52 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.247 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fb (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101001.gz:Sep 30 18:11:25 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.247 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fb (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:20:07 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:20:50 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:20:54 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:26:44 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:27:06 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:27:52 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:28:45 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:29:29 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101003.gz:Oct  2 10:30:29 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101008.gz:Oct  7 01:49:06 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101009.gz:Oct  8 22:12:09 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.166 to 00:17:f2:2c:b0:74 (ghost-macbook) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101009.gz:Oct  8 22:15:06 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.166 to 00:17:f2:2c:b0:74 (ghost-macbook) via 18.55.0.1  
ghost.txt:dhcplogger/dhcp-20101009.gz:Oct  8 22:58:57 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.55.212 to 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc (ghost-laptop) via 18.55.0.1 
ghost-laptop_dhcp_01062011.txt:dhcp-20110107.gz:Jan  6 12:42:49 installer dhcpd: DHCPOFFER on 18.2.53.219 to 00:4c:e5:a0:c7:56 (ghost-laptop) via 18.53.0.1  
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(the following is not part of the archives)
λ>  (\x -> "curl" ++ " -O" ++ " www.jstor.org/pdfs/" ++ x ++ ".pdf") "landau_
siegel"
"curl -O www.jstor.org/pdfs/landau_siegel.pdf"
I forgot to answer the most basic or obvious question regarding keepgrabbing.py, so I’ll do it here.
Why was the program called ‘keepgrabbing’?
Well, because that’s what it did. It just kept downloading without interruptions.
That’s because of the “while 1:” statement.
e.g.
while 1:










The only way to interrupt it would have been through a command-line interrupt (^C) /
KeyboardInterrupt.
At least that’s my (current) understanding of it. - It’s still preferable to no explanation at all.
(If this had been a novel or any other work of art, it would have perhaps probably been more
evident that such questions ought to be answered…)
